Japan, South Korea, Canada, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and New Zealand are becoming increasingly connected to Europe’s research and innovation ecosystem. What does this mean for European manufacturing, and where should the boundaries of international cooperation lie?

European manufacturing does not operate in isolation. The technologies shaping the next generation of production, from robotics and artificial intelligence to advanced materials, semiconductors, batteries and clean technologies, are increasingly developed through international research and industrial networks. Manufacturers also depend on global supply chains, international markets and access to specialised skills and knowledge.

Horizon Europe reflects this reality. Associated countries contribute financially to the programme and can participate on terms that are, in many respects, similar to those of EU Member States; under association agreements, EU organisations can in turn participate in equivalent programmes in partner countries. This international dimension is particularly important for the industrial part of Horizon Europe. According to the European Commission’s interim evaluation, 48% of collaborative Horizon Europe projects involve at least one organisation from an associated country. In Pillar II, focused on Global Challenges and European Industrial Competitiveness, the figure reaches 62%, compared with 44% under Horizon 2020.

For European manufacturing, the central question is therefore not simply whether Horizon Europe should become more international. It is whether international participation strengthens European industrial competitiveness, or risks creating new dependencies and strengthening competitors. The answer depends less on how many countries participate than on why, where and under what conditions Europe chooses to collaborate.

A changing map of European research and innovation

The group of countries associated with Horizon Europe is now broad and geographically diverse. It includes European neighbours and EFTA countries, but also major research and industrial economies further afield, including Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Switzerland is also associated, while Türkiye has a long-standing relationship with the EU research framework programmes.

This is more than a geographical expansion. Different partners bring different technological capabilities, industrial structures and strategic interests. Some complement European strengths; others provide access to major research ecosystems, strategic technologies or resources; and some are already deeply integrated into European industrial value chains. For manufacturing, the traditional distinction between “European” and “non-European” research is therefore becoming less useful than understanding the specific value and risks of each partnership.

Japan: technological complementarity

Japan is the most recent major addition to this landscape. On 30 July 2026, it became associated with Pillar II of Horizon Europe, with retroactive application from 1 January 2026. Japanese organisations can now lead and coordinate Pillar II projects and receive Horizon Europe funding under conditions similar to those applying to organisations from EU Member States and other associated countries.

The manufacturing relevance is clear. Japan has long-standing strengths in robotics, industrial automation, precision engineering, advanced materials, electronics and automotive technologies, while Europe has strong capabilities across industrial machinery, process industries, sustainable production, mobility, energy systems and industrial software. The opportunity is not simply to add Japanese partners to European projects, but to combine complementary capabilities in areas where cooperation can accelerate technological development or open new industrial pathways. The EU–Japan cooperation on advanced materials, including an enhanced dialogue to identify opportunities in strategically important materials research, illustrates this approach.

Japan therefore provides a useful test of whether two highly developed manufacturing ecosystems can become more competitive by combining their strengths.

South Korea: cooperation in strategic manufacturing technologies

The Republic of Korea became associated with Horizon Europe from 1 January 2025 and can participate in Pillar II, including by leading international consortia. The EU and Korea already have a long-standing science and technology relationship covering areas such as digital technologies, AI, quantum technologies, clean energy and climate research.

For manufacturing, Korea is particularly significant because of its position in semiconductors, batteries, electronics, displays, automotive technologies and digital industries technologies that are central to Europe’s future competitiveness. Cooperation can give European organisations access to expertise and stronger international networks while accelerating innovation. At the same time, because Europe is seeking to strengthen its own position in many of these technologies, questions around intellectual property, industrial capacity and economic security become more prominent. Korea shows why international cooperation and strategic autonomy need not be mutually exclusive, but must be managed together.

Canada: broadening Europe’s innovation ecosystem

The EU–Canada association agreement for Pillar II was signed in July 2024, allowing Canadian researchers and organisations to participate on equal terms with their European counterparts. The Commission reports that this has already resulted in more than 100 Canadian participations in Horizon Europe projects.

Canada brings recognised strengths in artificial intelligence, advanced materials, clean technologies, aerospace, digital technologies and quantum research. It also gives European organisations stronger links with the wider North American research and innovation ecosystem. For manufacturing, the value extends beyond individual technologies: cooperation can provide access to new knowledge and markets, while partnerships in clean technologies and strategic resources can help diversify and strengthen value chains. Canada therefore illustrates how Horizon Europe can connect European industrial ecosystems with complementary international networks as well as support technology development.

Türkiye: strengthening European industrial value chains

Türkiye represents a different model. It has participated in the EU Framework Programmes since 2003 and is now an established Horizon Europe partner. Its relevance to manufacturing comes from the depth of its industrial links with Europe, particularly in automotive, machinery, metals, textiles, appliances and electronics.

In these interconnected sectors, research and innovation cooperation can directly improve production capabilities on both sides. Digitalisation, energy efficiency, advanced production technologies and industrial decarbonisation do not stop at national borders; improving technologies and processes across shared value chains can make the wider European manufacturing ecosystem more productive, sustainable and resilient. The value of cooperation with Türkiye is therefore less about access to a distant new technology than about strengthening industrial value chains that are already closely connected.

The United Kingdom: reconnecting a major European R&I ecosystem

The United Kingdom has been associated with Horizon Europe since 1 January 2024. UK researchers can lead consortia and receive direct Horizon Europe funding, and since 2025 access has widened in sensitive areas including quantum, space, AI, robotics and connected collaborative computing.

The UK brings substantial capabilities in advanced research and innovation, including artificial intelligence, aerospace, engineering, robotics, materials and digital technologies. Its participation matters not only because it is a major research country, but because it reconnects a significant European research and innovation ecosystem with EU collaborative programmes. The Commission’s data illustrate the scale of that participation: in 2024, the UK was the largest beneficiary of Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions and the second-largest beneficiary of European Research Council grants. For manufacturing, the UK case shows that internationalisation can also mean reconnecting highly complementary European capabilities across institutional boundaries.

Switzerland: excellence and specialised manufacturing

Switzerland became associated with Horizon Europe in November 2025, with retroactive application from January 2025. Its importance to European manufacturing lies less in scale than in the concentration of specialised capabilities in precision engineering, advanced manufacturing, robotics, instrumentation, materials and other high-value industrial technologies.

For European consortia, Switzerland can provide targeted access to specialised expertise and research infrastructure that complements broader industrial ecosystems. Its participation is a reminder that the strategic value of a partner should not be measured only by the size of its economy: a smaller country with highly specialised capabilities can be critical to a particular technology or value chain.

New Zealand: specialised expertise and global challenges

New Zealand is a smaller player in industrial terms, but it is part of the changing Horizon Europe landscape. The Commission reports that the number of signed grants involving New Zealand organisations almost tripled between 2022 and 2024.

Its relevance to manufacturing is less about competing with Europe’s large industrial bases and more about specialised expertise, particularly in agriculture and food systems, the bioeconomy, environmental research and climate-related innovation. New Zealand illustrates a broader point: valuable international partners do not all need to be major manufacturing powers. Cooperation can also provide access to distinctive knowledge, research environments and expertise in areas where Europe faces shared global challenges.

And then there is China

Any serious discussion of the internationalisation of European manufacturing R&I must address China. China is not an associated country of Horizon Europe, although the EU maintains bilateral science and technology cooperation with it and Chinese organisations can participate under specific conditions. The Commission notes that high-income third-country participants generally bring their own funding, while specific co-funding mechanisms can facilitate participation; China is among the countries with such a mechanism.

China is fundamentally different from the other cases discussed here. It is simultaneously a major research partner, the world’s largest manufacturing economy, a critical part of global supply chains and a major competitor in many strategic technologies. Cooperation can be valuable in areas such as climate change, environmental technologies and other global challenges, but in strategic industrial technologies it also raises sharper questions about technology security, intellectual property, dependencies and economic security.

China therefore brings the central dilemma into focus: how open should Europe be when a partner is simultaneously a collaborator and a major strategic competitor?

From international participation to industrial impact

There are strong reasons for Europe to maintain an international dimension to Horizon Europe. International partners can contribute specialised scientific and technological expertise, research infrastructure, complementary industrial capabilities, access to markets and networks, opportunities to diversify supply chains, exposure to different technological approaches and additional resources for collaborative research.

The Commission’s interim evaluation confirms that international cooperation is already an important part of the programme. Associated countries account for 10% of participation in collaborative projects and 6% of the EU contribution to those projects. Nearly half of collaborative projects involve at least one associated country, rising to 62% in Pillar II.

However, participation is not the same as impact. The available evidence demonstrates the value of Horizon Europe and the growing role of international partners, but it does not yet provide a straightforward measure of the additional economic value created specifically by international collaboration. For the manufacturing community, counting projects and participants is therefore not enough. The more useful question is whether international collaboration produces stronger industrial outcomes.

Future evaluations could examine outcomes such as patents and intellectual property; new products, processes and services; technology-readiness progression; private investment; productivity and employment; industrial scale-up; exports and access to new markets; SME participation; lasting industrial partnerships; and the resilience of European value chains. Comparing strategically selected international projects with otherwise similar European-only projects could help distinguish international participation from genuine international added value.

Openness versus strategic autonomy

This distinction matters as Europe places greater emphasis on strategic autonomy and economic security. Greater international openness may appear to conflict with these objectives, but it does not necessarily do so. Europe cannot realistically or advantageously develop every technology independently. Manufacturing competitiveness depends on international access to knowledge, technologies, skills, resources and markets.

The objective should therefore not be technological isolation, but strategic interdependence: maintaining strong international connections while ensuring that Europe retains sufficient capabilities in technologies and value chains that are critical to its economic security. That requires a more selective approach to cooperation. The question is no longer simply who can participate, but where participation strengthens Europe’s capabilities and where it could create unacceptable dependencies.

What does this mean for Made in Europe?

For EFFRA and the Made in Europe community, the changing international landscape is an opportunity to think more strategically about partnerships. The strongest collaborations will not necessarily involve the greatest number of countries; they will be those in which international participation serves a clear industrial rationale.

Japan can offer technological complementarity in advanced manufacturing; South Korea can deepen cooperation in strategic technologies such as batteries, semiconductors and electronics; Canada can connect European organisations to the wider North American research and innovation ecosystem; Türkiye can reinforce value chains already closely integrated with Europe; the United Kingdom can reconnect major research and engineering capabilities; Switzerland can provide highly specialised expertise and precision technologies; and New Zealand can contribute distinctive knowledge in selected global challenges. China, meanwhile, illustrates where the benefits of cooperation need to be weighed particularly carefully against economic-security concerns and technological dependence.

These are fundamentally different relationships. Treating them all in the same way would miss much of their value and much of the strategic challenge.

The next phase: strategic internationalisation

The internationalisation of Horizon Europe is likely to continue. The Commission has proposed a Horizon Europe budget of €175 billion for 2028–2034, approximately twice the size of the current programme. Association discussions are also continuing with other major research economies: negotiations with Australia concluded in June 2026 with a view to association from 2027, while negotiations with India were launched in July 2026.

For manufacturing, this expanding geographical reach should not be seen simply as an enlargement of the programme. It is an opportunity to shape a global network around European industrial priorities. The principle should be straightforward: international cooperation should make European manufacturing more innovative, productive, resilient and competitive.

That requires openness, but not openness without strategy. Partnerships should be based on complementarity, reciprocity and trust, with appropriate safeguards for sensitive technologies and better evidence about where the economic value of collaborative research is ultimately created.

The question facing Europe is therefore no longer whether Horizon Europe should look beyond its borders, but how those international connections can strengthen Europe’s own industrial future. For the European manufacturing community, that is both the opportunity and the responsibility of the next generation of Horizon Europe.